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Abstract
Bitcoin is the first fully-decentralized permissionless block-
chain protocol to achieve a high level of security: the ledger it
maintains has guaranteed liveness and consistency properties
as long as the adversary has less compute power than the hon-
est nodes. However, its throughput is only 7 transactions per
second and the confirmation latency can be up to hours. Prism
is a new blockchain protocol which is designed to achieve a
natural scaling of Bitcoin’s performance while maintaining
its full security guarantees. We present an implementation
of Prism which achieves a throughput of over 70,000 transac-
tions per second and confirmation latency of tens of seconds
on networks of up to 1000 EC2 Virtual Machines.
1 Introduction
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto invented Bitcoin and the concept
of blockchains [26]. Since then, blockchains have attracted
considerable interest for their applications in cross-border
payments [19, 20], digital contracts [11, 29, 35] and more.
At the heart of Bitcoin and many other blockchain projects
is the Nakamoto longest chain protocol. It enables an open
(permissionless) network of nodes to reach consensus on
an ordered log of transactions and is tolerant to Byzantine
adversarial attacks with no more than 50% of the compute
power in the network. To achieve this high level of security,
however, the longest chain protocol severely limits transaction
throughput and latency (§3). Bitcoin, for example, supports
3–7 transactions per second and can take hours to confirm a
transaction with a high level of reliability [26].
The limitations of the longest chain protocol have led to
a flurry of work in recent years on more scalable blockchain
consensus protocols (§2 discusses related work). However,
until recently, no protocol has been shown to guarantee Bitcoin-
level security as well as high throughput and low latency.
Prism [7] is the first such protocol. Prism is a Proof-of-Work
(PoW) blockchain consensus protocol that is (1) secure against
50% adversarial compute power, (2) can achieve optimal
throughput (up to the network communication bandwidth),
and (3) can achieve near-optimal confirmation latency (on
the order of the network’s propagation delay). Prism removes
the throughput and latency limitations of the longest chain
protocol by systematically decoupling security and throughput
in the blockchain (§4). A recent theoretical paper described
the core protocol and analyzed its security properties [7].
While these theoretical results are promising, it is not clear
how well they can translate into real-world performance.
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Figure 1: Throughput and confirmation latency of Prism, Algorand,
and the longest chain protocol on the same testbed. Note that the
axes are on log scales. For Algorand and the longest chain protocol,
parameters are tuned to span an optimized tradeoff between through-
put and latency at a given security level. For Prism, throughput and
latency are decoupled so one can simultaneously optimize both at
one operating point for a given security level. More details in §7.1.
First, the Prism consensus protocol is much more complex
than the longest chain protocol. It requires each participating
client to maintain 1000 distinct blockchains simultaneously;
these chains refer to each other to create an intricate directed
acyclic graph (DAG) structure, from which the final ledger
of transactions is formed. Second, clients must process blocks
at very high rates (e.g., 100-1000s of blocks per second
at 100s of Mbps), update the different chains, and confirm
transactions. Third, the performance of a blockchain system
depends on more than the consensus protocol. The consensus
protocol orders transactions, but to confirm them, the client
must execute the transactions in order and keep track of the
state of the ledger. Though some academic prototypes ignore
transaction execution (eg. [3, 23]), in practice, it often turns
out to be the bottleneck, c.f., §7.3, [31].
In this paper, we present the design (§5) and implementation
(§6) of a Bitcoin-like system based on the Prism consensus
protocol. Our implementation features payments as multi-
input-multi-output transactions (payments) similar to pay-to-
public-key (P2PK) in Bitcoin and Algorand [1, 18]. We evalu-
ate our system on a testbed of up to 1000 EC2 Virtual Machines
connected via an emulated wide area network. Figure 1 sum-
marizes the results. Prism consistently achieves a throughput
of over 70,000 tps for a range of security levels β denoting the
fraction of adversarial compute power. To guarantee a reversal
probability of less than 10−9, Prism’s latency ranges from 13
seconds against an adversary of powerβ=20%, to 296 seconds
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for β=44%. To our knowledge, this makes our system by far
the fastest implementation of a blockchain system with Bitcoin-
level security guarantees. Compared to the longest chain pro-
tocol, Prism provides about 10,000× higher throughput and
1,000× lower latency. Compared to Algorand [18], the state-of-
the-art proof-of-stake system, Prism achieves 70× the through-
put with marginally higher latency, and can provide a higher
level of security (up to β=50% vs. β=33% for Algorand).
To achieve this performance, our design includes several
key performance optimizations, such as asychoronous ledger
updates, and a scoreboarding technique that enables parallel
transaction execution without race conditions. We show that
these optimizations alleviate CPU performance bottlenecks
and provide linear CPU scaling, such that the primary
bottleneck is the underlying database (RocksDB [5] and I/O
to persistent storage (SSDs)). Further performance improve-
ments may therefore be possible by optimizing the database.
The source code is available [4] under the MIT license.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2 we
discuss different scaling approaches taken in blockchains. In
§3 we discuss the longest chain protocol and its limitations
to motivate the design of the Prism protocol in §4 and §5. An
implementation of Prism is enabled via a client written in
roughly 10,000 lines of Rust code; the details of the client
with an interface enabling pay-to-public-key transactions
is detailed in §6. Evaluations are presented in §7 to assess
the impact of network resources (bandwidth, topology,
propagation delay) and computation resources (memory,
CPU) on the overall performance. §8 discusses extensions.
2 Related Work
There are broadly three different approaches to scale the
performance of blockchains. First, on-chain scaling aims
to design consensus protocols with inherently high through-
put and low latency. Protocols such as Bitcoin-NG [15],
GHOST [32], Algorand [18], OHIE [36] are examples of
this approach. Second, in off-chain scaling, users establish
cryptographically-locked agreements called “payment
channels” [14] and send most of the transactions off-chain on
those channels. Lightning [30] and Eltoo [13] are examples
of this approach. Third, sharding approaches conceptually
maintain multiple “slow” blockchains that achieve high
performance in aggregate. Omniledger [21], Ethereum 2.0 [9],
and Monoxide [34] are examples of this approach. These three
approaches are orthogonal and can be combined to aggregate
their individual performance gains.
Since Prism is an on-chain scaling solution, we compare it
with other on-chain solutions. We explicitly exclude protocols
with different trust and security assumptions, like Stellar [24]
and Ripple [10], which require clients to pre-configure a
set of trusted nodes. Among protocols with similar security
assumptions to ours, Bitcoin-NG [15] mines blocks at a low
rate similar to the longest chain protocol. In addition, each
block’s miner continuously adds transactions to the ledger
until the next block is mined. This utilizes the capacity of
the network between the infrequent mining events, thereby
improving throughput, but latency remains the same as that
of the longest-chain protocol. However, an adversary which
adaptively corrupts miners can reduce its throughput to that
of the longest chain protocol by censoring the addition of
transactions [16]. Prism adopts this spirit of decoupling the
addition of transactions from the election into the main chain
but avoids this adaptive attack. (See §4.2.)
DAG-based solutions like GHOST [32], Inclusive [22],
and Conflux [23] were designed to operate at high mining
rates, and their blocks form a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
However, these protocols were later shown to be insecure
because they don’t guarantee liveness, i.e. the ledger stops
to grow, under certain attacks [27]. The blockchain structure
maintained by Prism is also a DAG, but a structured one with
a clear separation of blocks into different types with different
functionalities (Figure 4). OHIE [36] and Parallel Chains [16]
build on these lessons by running many slow, secure longest
chains in parallel, which gives high aggregate throughput at the
same latency as the longest-chain protocol. To our knowledge,
Parallel Chains has not been implemented. In OHIE’s latest
implementation, clients do not maintain the UTXO state
of the blockchain and transactions are signed messages
without any context, so it is hard to compare with OHIE in our
experiments, where all nodes maintain the full UTXO state.
Algorand [18] takes a different approach by adopting a proof
of stake consensus protocol and tuning various parameters to
maximize the performance. We compare to Algorand in §7.1.
Importantly, none of the above protocols simultaneously
achieve both high throughput and low latency. Their reported
throughputs are all lower than Prism’s, and their latencies are
all higher than or (in the case of Algorand) similar to Prism’s.
3 The Longest Chain Protocol
The most basic blockchain consensus protocol is Nakamoto’s
longest chain protocol, used in many systems including Bitcoin
and Ethereum. The basic object is a block, consisting of trans-
actions and a reference link to another block. As transactions
arrive into the system, a set of nodes, called miners, construct
blocks and broadcast them to other nodes. The goal of the pro-
tocol is for all nodes to reach consensus on an ordered log of
blocks (and the transactions therein), referred to as the ledger.
Starting with the genesis block as the root, each new block
mined by a miner is added to create an evolving blocktree. In
the longest chain protocol, honest miners append each block
to the leaf block of the longest chain in the current blocktree,
and the transactions in that block are added to the transaction
ledger maintained by the blocks in the longest chain. A miner
earns the right to append a block after solving a cryptographic
puzzle, which requires finding a solution to a hash inequality.
The miner includes the solution in the block as a proof of
work (PoW), which other nodes can verify. The time to solve
the puzzle is random and exponentially distributed, with a
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Figure 2: Depth of confirmation: longest chain vs. Prism. (a) The
longest chain protocol requires a block Ho to be many blocks deep
for reliable confirmation, so that an adversary mining in private
cannot create a longer chain to reverse block Ho. (b) Prism allows
each voter block to be very shallow but relies on many voter chains
to increase the reliability.
mining rate f that can be tuned by adjusting the difficulty of
the puzzle. How fast an individual miner can solve the puzzle
and mine the block is proportional to its hashing power, i.e.
how fast it can compute hashes.
A block is confirmed to be in the ledger when it is k-deep
in the ledger, i.e. the block is on the longest chain and a chain
of k−1 blocks have been appended to it. It is proven that as
long as the adversary has less than 50% hashing power, the
ledger has consistency and liveness properties [17]: blocks
that are deep enough in the longest chain will remain in the
longest chain with high probability, and honest miners will
be able to enter a non-zero fraction of blocks into the ledger.
3.1 Latency Limitation
A critical attack on the longest chain protocol is the private
double-spend attack [26], as shown in Figure 2(a). Here, an
adversary is trying to revert a block after it is confirmed, by
mining a chain in private and broadcasting it when it is longer
than the public chain. If the hashing power of the adversary is
greater than that of aggregate of the honest nodes, this attack
can be easily executed no matter what k is, since the adversary
can mine blocks faster on the average than the honest nodes and
will eventually overtake the public chain. On the other hand,
when the adversary has less than half the power, the probability
of success of this attack can be made exponentially small by
choosing the confirmation depth k to be large [26]. The price
to pay for choosing k large is increased latency in confirmation.
For example, to achieve a reversal probability of 0.001, a depth
of 24 blocks is needed if the adversary has β = 30% of the
total hashing power [26]. Figure 3 shows the tradeoff between
confirmation depth (and therefore latency) and reliability.
3.2 Throughput Limitation
If B is the block size in number of transactions, then the through-
put of the longest chain protocol is at most f B transactions per
second (tps). However, the mining rate f and the block size
B are constrained by the security requirement. Increasing the
mining rate increases the amount of forking of the blockchain
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Figure 3: Reliability as a function of confirmation depth. The
reversal probability of Prism has a factor m improvement over the
longest chain protocol in the exponential rate of decrease, where m
is the number of voter chains (introduced in §4).
due to multiple blocks being mined on the same leaf block by
multiple miners within the network delay ∆. Forking reduces
throughput since it reduces the growth rate of the longest
chain; recall that only blocks on the longest chain contribute to
the ledger. More importantly, forking hurts the security of the
protocol because the adversary requires less compute power to
overtake the longest chain. In fact, the adversarial power that
can be tolerated by the longest chain protocol goes from 50%
to 0% as the mining rate f increases [17]. Similarly, increasing
the block size B also increases the amount of forking since
the network delay ∆ increases with the block size [12].
A back-of-the-envelope calculation of the impact of the fork-
ing can be done based on a simple model of the network delay:
∆=
hB
C
+D,
where h is the average number of hops for a block to travel,
C is the communication bandwidth per link in transactions per
second, and D is the end-to-end propagation delay. This model
is consistent with the linear relation between the network
delay and the block size as measured empirically by [12].
Hence, the utilization, i.e. the throughput as a fraction of the
communication bandwidth, is upper bounded by
f B
C
<
f∆
h
,
where f∆ is the average number of blocks “in flight” at any
given time, and reflects the amount of forking in the block tree.
In the longest chain protocol, to be secure against an adversary
with β<50% of hash power, this parameter should satisfy [17]
f∆<
1−2β
β
.
For example, to achieve security against an adversary with
β=45% of the total hashing power, one needs f∆≈0.2. With
h=5, this translates to a utilization of at most 4%. The above
bound holds regardless of block size; the utilization of the
longest chain protocol cannot exceed 4% for β = 45% and
h=5. Therefore, to not compromise on security, f∆must be
kept much smaller than 1. Hence, the security requirement (as
well as the number of hops) limits the bandwidth utilization.
4 Overview of Prism
The selection of a main chain in a blockchain protocol can be
viewed as electing a leader block among all the blocks at each
level of the blocktree. In this light, the blocks in the longest
chain protocol can be viewed as serving three distinct roles:
they stand for election to be leaders; they add transactions to the
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Figure 4: Prism: Factorizing the blocks into three types of blocks:
proposer blocks, transaction blocks and voter blocks.
main chain; they vote for ancestor blocks through parent link
relationships. The latency and throughput limitations of the
longest chain protocol are due to the coupling of the roles car-
ried by the blocks. Prism removes these limitations by factoriz-
ing the blocks into three types of blocks: proposer blocks, trans-
action blocks and voter blocks. (Figure 4). Each block mined
by a miner is randomly sortitioned into one of the three types of
blocks, and if it is a voter block, it will be further sortitioned into
one of the voter trees. (Mining is described in detail in §5.2).
The proposer blocktree anchors the Prism blockchain. Each
proposer block contains a list of reference links to transaction
blocks, which contains transactions, as well as a single refer-
ence to a parent proposer block. Honest nodes mine proposer
blocks on the longest chain in the proposer tree, but the longest
chain does not determine the final confirmed sequence of pro-
poserblocks, known as the leader sequence. We define the level
of a proposer block as its distance from the genesis proposer
block, and the height of the proposer tree as the maximum level
that contains any proposer blocks. The leader sequence of pro-
poser blocks contains one block at every level up to the height
of the proposer tree, and is determined by the voter chains.
There are m voter chains, where m1 is a fixed parameter
chosen by the system designer. The ith voter chain is
comprised of voter blocks that are mined on the longest chain
of the ith voter trees. A voter block votes for a proposer block
by containing a reference link to that proposer block, with the
requirements that: 1) a vote is valid only if the voter block is in
the longest chain of its voter tree; 2) each voter chain votes for
one and only one proposer block at each level. The leader block
at each level is the one which has the highest number of votes
among all the proposer blocks at the same level (tie broken by
hash of the proposer blocks.) The elected leader blocks then
provide a unique ordering of the transaction blocks to form the
final ledger. Ledger formation is explained in detail in §5.3).
4.1 Security and Latency
The votes from the voter trees secure each leader proposer
block, because changing an elected leader requires reversing
enough votes to give them to a different proposer block in that
level. Each vote is in turn secured by the longest chain protocol
in its voter tree. If the adversary has less than 50% hash power,
and the mining rate in each of the voter trees is kept small to
minimize forking, then the consistency and liveness of each
voter tree guarantee the consistency and liveness of the ledger
maintained by the leader proposer blocks. However, this
would appear to require a long latency to wait for each voter
block to get sufficiently deep in its chain. What is interesting
is that when there are many voter chains, the same guarantee
can be achieved without requiring each and every vote to have
a very low reversal probability, thus drastically improving
over the latency of the longest chain protocol.
To get some intuition, consider the natural analog of the
private double-spend attack on the longest chain protocol in
Prism. Figure 2(b) shows the scenario. An honest proposer
block Ho at a particular level has collected votes from the
voter chains. Over time, each of these votes will become
deeper in its voter chain. An attack by the adversary is to mine
a private proposer block A at the same level, and on each of
the voter trees, fork off and mine a private alternate chain and
send its vote to block A. After leader block Ho is confirmed,
the adversary continues to mine on each of the alternate voter
chains to attempt to overtake the public longest chain and
shift the vote from Ho to A. If the adversary can thereby get
more votes on A than on Ho, then its attack is successful. The
question is how deep do we have to wait for each vote to be
in its voter chain in order to confirm the proposer block Ho?
Nakamoto’s calculations will help us answer this question.
As an example, at tolerable adversary power β = 30%, the
reversal probability in a single chain is 0.45 when a block is
2-deep [26]. With m=1000 voter chains and each vote being
2-deep, the expected number of chains that can be reversed by
the adversary is 450. The probability that the adversary can get
lucky and reverse more than half the votes, i.e. 500, is about
0.001. Hence to achieve a reversal probability, ε=0.001, we
only need to wait for the votes to be 2-deep, as opposed to
the 24 block depth needed in the longest chain protocol (§3.1).
This reduction in latency comes without sacrificing security:
each voter chain can operate at a slow enough mining rate to
tolerate β adversarial hash power. Furthermore, increasing the
number of voter chains can further improve the confirmation
reliability without sacrificing latency; for example, doubling
the number of voter chains from 1000 to 2000 can reduce the
reversal probability from 0.001 to 10−6.
We have discussed one specific attack, focusing on the case
when there is a single public proposer block on a given level.
Another possible attack is when there are two or more such
proposer blocks and the adversary tries to balance the votes
between them to delay confirmation. It turns out that the attack
space is quite huge and these are formally analyzed in [7] to
obtain the following guarantee on the confirmation latency,
regardless of the attack:
Theorem 1 (Latency, Thm. 4.8 [7]). For an adversary with
β<50% of hash power, network propagation delay D, Prism
with m chains confirms honest1 transactions at reversal
1Honest transactions are ones which have no conflicting double-spent
transactions broadcast in public.
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probability ε guarantee with latency upper bounded by
Dc1(β)+
Dc2(β)
m
log
1
ε
seconds, (1)
where c1(β) and c2(β) are β dependent constants.
For large number of voter chains m, the first term dominates
the above equation and therefore Prism achieves near optimal
latency, i.e. proportional to the propagation delay D and
independent of the reversal probability. Figure 3 compares
the latency-reliability tradeoffs of Prism and the longest chain
protocol. Note that (1) is a worst-case latency bound that holds
for all attacks. In Section 7.4, we will evaluate the latency of
our system under the balancing attack.
4.2 Throughput
To keep Prism secure, the mining rate and the size of the voter
blocks have to be chosen such that each voter chain has little
forking. The mining rate and the size of the proposer blocks
have to be also chosen such that there is very little forking in the
proposer tree. Otherwise, the adversary can propose a block
at each level, breaking the liveness of the system. Hence, the
throughput of Prism would be as low as the longest chain proto-
col if transactions were carried by the proposer blocks directly.
To decouple security from throughput, transactions are
instead carried by separate transaction blocks. Each proposer
block when it is mined refers to the transaction blocks that
have not been referred to by previous proposer blocks. This
design allows throughput to be increased by increasing the
mining rate of the transaction blocks, without affecting the
security of the system. The throughput is only limited by the
computing or communication bandwidth limit C of each node,
thus potentially achieving 100% utilization. In contrast, as we
discussed in §3.2, the throughput of the longest chain protocol
is security-limited, resulting in low network utilization. [7]
formally proves that Prism achieves near optimal throughput:
Theorem 2 (Throughput, Thm. 4.4 [7] ). For an adversary
with β<50% fraction of hash power and network capacity C,
Prism can achieve (1−β)C throughput and maintain liveness
in the ledger.
Note that the reference links from a proposer block to
its transaction blocks are sealed in the proof-of-work of the
proposer block. Hence, once a proposer block is mined, there
is no way for an attacker to change the reference links to the
transaction blocks. In contrast, the transactions that a miner in
Bitcoin-NG adds onto the ledger after its block enters the main
chain are not sealed by the proof-of-work. Hence, Bitcoin-NG
is susceptible to censorship attacks.
5 Design
5.1 Notation
Each block B= (H,C) is a tuple containting a header H and
content C. As discussed in §4, there are three types of blocks:
transaction blocks, proposer blocks, and voter blocks. In all
three types, the header H=(P,n,D) is a tuple containing: (1)
the hash P of the parent block, (2) a valid PoW nonce n, and
(3) a content digest D=Digest(C). We add a superscript to
the above notations to denote the type of block being referred.
For example, we refer to proposer blocks by BP, transaction
blocks by BT , and voter blocks by BV .
5.2 Mining
Miners should not be able to choose a priori which type of
block they are mining; this is essential for the security of the
scheme, since otherwise the adversary could concentrate all
of its power on a subset of block trees and overpower them.
Cryptographic sortition is used to ensure that miners cannot
choose which type of block they mine. Nodes simultaneously
mine one transaction block, one proposer block, and m voter
blocks (one for each tree). Only after a valid proof of work is
found does the miner learn if the mined block is a transaction,
proposer, or voter block. The mining process has three steps
(four including validation):
(1) Superblock generation. When a miner starts mining, it
creates a superblock that simultaneously contains the parents
and contents for all m+2 possible sub-blocks (1 transaction
sub-block, 1 proposer, and m voter sub-blocks). The parents
and contents differ for each type of block. This superblock is
updated whenever the miner receives a new network message
that changes either the header or the content of any of the
sub-blocks.
Transaction sub-block BT : Transaction blocks do not need a
parent block, so PT = /0. The content of a transaction block, CT ,
is an ordered list of transactions, drawn from a data structure
similar to the Bitcoin mempool, except in Bitcoin, mempool
stores all transactions that have not yet been included in the
main chain; in Prism, once a transaction is included in a valid
transaction block, it is permanently removed from themempool.
This is because the transaction block (hence its contained
transactions), is guaranteed to eventually be included in the
ledger (§5.3). Upon receiving a new transaction block over the
network, the miner should remove the transactions in the new
block from its own mempool and transaction block content.
Proposer sub-block BP: Proposer tree is built in a longest-
chain fashion; proposer blocks choose as their parent PP the
tip of the longest chain in the proposer tree. Each proposer
block’s content, CP :=(CP1 ,C
P
2 ), is an ordered list of references
to other proposer and transaction blocks, where CP1 is an
ordered list of proposer blocks that are neither referenced nor
among content of BP’s ancestor block2, and CP2 is an ordered
list of transaction blocks that are not referenced (directly or
indirectly) by any of BP’s ancestors or by any of the proposer
blocks in CP1 . A miner updates content C
P upon receiving a
new transaction block or a new proposer block.
Voter sub-block BVi in the ith voter tree: Voter trees are also
built in a longest-chain fashion; the parent of voter block BVi ,
PVi , is the tip of the longest chain in the ith voter tree. The
2 ancestor blocks are computed by following the chain of links from BP
in the proposer tree
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content, CVi , is a list of references to proposer blocks, or votes.
Each voter tree’s longest chain is allowed to vote at most one
proposer block on any level3 of the proposer tree. Let h denote
the last level in the proposer blocktree and `B denote the last
level voted by BVi’s ancestors. Then the content of the voter
block BVi is CV :=[BP
`′B+1
,...,BPh ], list of proposer blocks where
with some abuse of notation, BP` denotes a vote for (pointer to)
a proposer block at level `. In words, the voter block contains
a list of one vote per unvoted level in the block’s ancestors.
By default, nodes will vote for the first proposer block
they see at a given level. Notice that the content CVi is
updated if the miner receives either a new proposer block at
a previously-unseen level or a new voter block for the ith tree
that changes the longest chain of that voter tree. In the former
case, the miner adds a vote for that level. In the latter case, the
miner updates its parent block PVi so as to extend the longest
chain and also updates the content CVi .
All the contents and parent links are concate-
nated into a superblock B = (H, C) with header
H = (P := [PT , PP, PV1 , ... , PVm ], n,D) and content C :=
[CT ,CP,CV1 ,...,CVm ]. The content digest D is explained next.
(2) PoW and sortition. Once the superblock is formed, the
miner mines by searching for a nonce n such that Hash(H)≤q,
where Hash(·) denotes a hash function, and q denotes a
difficulty threshold. For a one-way hash function, the miner
can do no better than brute-force search, so it cycles through
difference values of nonces n until finding one such that
Hash(H)≤ q. Upon finding a valid nonce, sortition occurs.
We divide the numbers from 0 to q into regions corresponding
to different block types. For example, [0,qT ] denotes a transac-
tion block, [qT +1,qP] denotes a proposer block, and [qP+1,q]
denotes voter blocks, split evenly into m regions, one per voter
tree. The output region of Hash(H) determines the block type.
(3) Block pruning. Passing around a large superblock after
mining would waste unnecessary bandwidth. Hence, to
improve space efficiency, instead of using the full concatenated
parent block and content lists, only the relevant content is
retained after mining and the type of the block is known.
For example, a mined proposer block would contain only
the proposer parent reference , PP, and proposer content,
CP; it would not store transactions or votes. However, if
we do this naively, block validators would not be able to
tell if the cryptographic sortition was correctly executed.
To address this, we alter our header to contain the follow-
ing: H = (MerkleRoot(P),n,D :=MerkleRoot(C)), where
MerkleRoot(·) denotes the Merkle root of a Merkle tree [25]
generated from the contained array. In addition to the pruned
content and header, we include sortition proofs, Merkle proofs
attesting to the fact that the block was mined correctly. In
our proposer block example, the Merkle proof would include
the sibling node for every node in the path from the proposer
content CP to the root MerkleRoot(C) in the Merkle tree.
3 level of a proposer block is its distance from the genesis block.
Figure 5: Ledger formation has three parts: (1) confirming a leader
sequence of proposer blocks; (2) creating a list of transactions; and
(3) sanitizing the transaction list for conflicts. In this figure, each
transaction block has only one transaction; suppose transactions (c)
and (d) are inconsistent (e.g., a double spend). A proposer block’s
black reference link denotes a parent link. Blue links denote reference
links; a proposer block can include reference links to transaction
blocks as well as proposer blocks.
Hence MerkleProof(C) (resp. MerkleProof(P)) is an array of
size log2(m) – a primary source of storage overhead in Prism
blocks.
(4) Block validation. Upon receiving a mined Prism block
B=(H,C), a validator checks two things. First, it checks that
Hash(H)≤ q and that the cryptographic sortition is correct
(i.e., that the hash maps to the correct region for the block
type). Next, it checks the sortition proof. To do this, it takes
content C (resp. parent) in the block, and ensures that the
Merkle proof validation gives the content (resp. parent) digest
in the header [25].
5.3 Ledger Formation
Prism achieves high throughput in part by mining multiple
transaction blocks simultaneously and allowing all of them to
contribute to the final ledger. A key consequence is that blocks
mined concurrently may contain redundant or conflicting
transactions. If Prism were to discard blocks that contain
inconsistent transactions, it would needlessly reduce through-
put by not confirming the transactions that are consistent. To
prevent this, Prism separates the process of confirming blocks
and forming a ledger. This is a key difference between Prism
and many other blockchain protocols. The formation of a
ledger in Prism occurs in three steps, as shown in Figure 5.
(1) Proposer block confirmation. First, we must confirm a
contiguous sequence of leader proposer blocks at each level.
Recall that the proposer block with the most votes on level
` is defined as the leader block at level `, and the sequence
of leader blocks for each level of the proposer tree is defined
as the leader sequence. Once we can guarantee that this
leader sequence is permanent for all levels up to some level
`with probability at least 1−ε, where ε is the target reversal
probability, we can confirm a leader block sequence. This
process is described in more detail below.
(2) Transaction ordering. Given a proposer block leader
sequence, we iterate over the sequence and list the referred
transaction blocks in the order they are referred. We use Li to
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denote the leader at level i. In Figure 5, we start with the leader
at level 1 L1, the left proposer block. L1 refers to only one
transaction block containing transaction a, so our ledger starts
with a. Next, we consider L2. It starts by referring to its parent,
the right proposer block at level 1. Since that proposer block
has not yet been included in the ledger, we include its referred
transactions—namely, a and b. L2 then adds L1, followed by
transaction blocks containing d and c, in that order. Since L1
was already added to our ledger, we ignore it, but add d and
c. This process continues until we reach the end of our leader
sequence.
(3) Ledger sanitization. In the previous step, we may have
added redundant or conflicting transactions. Hence, we
now execute the transaction list in the previously-specified
order. Any duplicate or invalid transactions are discarded.
In Figure 5, we discard the second instance of a (since it’s a
duplicate), and we discard c (since it conflicts with d).
The key to the above confirmation process is leader
proposer block confirmation (step 1). The leader block at a
given level ` can initially fluctuate when the voter trees start
voting on level `. However, as the voter trees grow, votes
on level ` are embedded deeper into their respective voter
trees, which (probabilistically) prevents the votes from being
reverted. Hence, we can confirm the leader block when: (1) a
plurality of voter trees have voted for it, and (2) that plurality is
guaranteed not to change with probability at least 1−ε, where
ε is a user-selected target reversal probability.
Our confirmation procedure calculates this probability
by computing a (1−ε)-confidence interval over the number
of votes on each leader block, as well as a hypothetical
“private” block that has not yet been released by a hypothetical
adversary that controls a fraction β of the hash power. Once
the leader block’s confidence interval is strictly larger than
any of the other candidates’ confidence intervals, we can be
sure (with probability at least 1− ε) that the current leader
will remain the leader for all time, so we confirm that proposer
block. The details of this confidence interval calculation are
included in Appendix A.
6 Implementation
We have implemented a Prism client in about 10,000 lines of
Rust code (available [4] under the MIT license). We describe
the architecture of our implementation and highlight several
design decisions that are key to its high performance.
6.1 Architecture
Our implementation is based on the unspent transaction output
(UTXO) model, similar to that used by Bitcoin. UTXOs are
generated by transactions. A transaction takes a list of UTXOs
(inputs) and defines a list of new UTXOs (outputs). Each
UTXO is only allowed to be spent once, and the state of the
ledger, i.e., the state that results from applying the transactions
that have been confirmed up to that point in the ledger, can be
represented as a set of UTXOs. Our implementation features a
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Figure 6: Architecture of our Prism client implementation.
simplified version of Bitcoin’s scripting language, processing
only pay-to-public-key (P2PK) transactions, similar to that im-
plemented in Algorand [1,18]. We use Ed25519 [8] for crypto-
graphic signatures and SHA-256 [28] as the hashing algorithm.
The system architecture is illustrated in Figure 6. Function-
ally it can be divided into the following three modules:
1. Block Structure Manager, which maintains the clients’
view of the blockchain, and communicates with peers to
exchange new blocks.
2. Ledger Manager, which updates the ledger based on
the latest blockchain state, executes transactions, and
maintains the UTXO set.
3. Miner, which assembles new blocks.
The ultimate goal of the Prism client is to maintain up-to-date
information of the blockchain and the ledger. To this end, it
maintains the following four data structures:
1. Block Structure Database, residing in persistent storage,
stores the graph structure of the blockchain (i.e., the voter
blocktrees, proposer blocktree, and transactions blocks
referenced) as well as the latest confirmed order of proposer
and transaction blocks.
2. Block Database, residing in persistent storage, stores every
block a client has learned about so far.
3. UTXO Database, residing in persistent storage, stores the
list of all UTXOs, as well as their value and owner.
4. Memory Pool, residing in memory, stores the set of
transactions that have not been mined in any block.
At the core of the Block Structure Manager are an event
loop which sends and receives network messages to/from
peers, and a worker thread pool which handles those messages.
When a new block arrives, the worker thread first checks its
proof of work and sortition, according to the rules specified
in §5.2, and stores the new block in the Block Database. 4 It
then proceeds to relay the block to peers that have not received
it. Next, the worker thread checks whether all blocks referred
to by the new block, e.g. its parent, are already present in the
database. If not, it buffers the block in an in-memory data
structure and defers further processing until all the block’s
references have been received. Once a block’s references
have all arrived, the worker performs further validation (e.g.,
verifying transaction signatures), and finally, the new block
is inserted into the Block Structure Database. If the block is
a transaction block, the Block Structure Manager also checks
4Checking proof of work at the earliest opportunity reduces the risk of
DDoS attacks.
7
the Memory Pool against the transactions included in this new
block, and removes any duplicates or conflicting ones.
The Ledger Manager is a two-stage pipeline and runs
asynchronously with respect to the Block Structure Manager.
Its first stage, the transaction sequencer, runs in a loop to
continuously poll the Block Structure Database and try to
confirm new transactions. It starts by updating the list of votes
cast on each proposer block. To avoid doing wasteful work,
it caches the vote counts and the tips of the voter chains, and
on each invocation, it only scans through the new voter blocks.
Then, it tries to confirm a leader for each level in the proposer
block tree as new votes are cast, according to the rules specified
in §5.3. In the case where a leader is selected, it queries the
Block Database to retrieve the transaction blocks confirmed by
the new leader, and assembles a list of confirmed transactions.
The list is passed on to the second stage of the pipeline,
the ledger sanitizer. This stage maintains a pool of worker
threads that executes the confirmed transactions in parallel.
Specifically, a worker thread queries the UTXO Database
to confirm that all inputs of the transaction are present; their
owners match the signatures of the transaction; and the total
value of the inputs is no less than that of the outputs. If
execution succeeds, the outputs of the transaction are inserted
into the UTXO Database, and the inputs are removed.
The Miner module assembles new blocks according to the
mining procedure described in §5.2. It is implemented as a
busy-spinning loop. At the start of each round, it polls the
Block Structure Database and the Memory Pool to update the
block it is mining. Like other academic implementations of
PoW systems [23, 36], our miner does not actually compute
hashes for the proof of work, and instead simulates mining by
waiting for an exponentially-distributed random delay. Solv-
ing the PoW puzzle in our experiments would waste energy
for no reason, and in practice, PoW will happen primarily
on dedicated hardware, e.g., application-specific integrated
circuits (ASICs). So the cost of mining will not contribute to
the computational bottlenecks of the consensus protocol.
The three databases residing in the persistent storage are all
built on RocksDB [5], a high-performance key-value storage
engine. We tuned the following RocksDB parameters to
optimize its performance: replacing B-trees with hash tables
as the index; adding bloom filters; adding a 512 MB LRU
cache; and increasing the size of the write buffer to 32 MB
to sustain temporary large writes.
6.2 Performance Optimizations
The key challenge to implementing the Prism client is to
handle its high throughput. The client must process blocks
at a rate of hundreds of blocks per second, or a throughput
of hundreds of Mbps, and confirm transactions at a high rate,
exceeding 70,000 tps in our implementation. To handle the
high throughput, our implementation exploits opportunities
for parallelism in the protocol and carefully manages race
conditions to achieve high concurrency. We now discuss
several key performance optimizations.
6.2.1 Asynchronous Ledger Updates
In traditional blockchains like Bitcoin, blocks are mined at
a low rate and clients update the ledger each time they receive
a new block. However in Prism, blocks are mined at a very
high rate and a only a small fraction of these blocks — those
that change the proposer block leader sequence — lead to
changes in the ledger. Therefore trying to update the ledger
synchronously for each new block is wasteful and can become
a CPU performance bottleneck.
Fortunately, Prism does not require synchronous ledger up-
dates to process blocks. Since Prism allows conflicting or du-
plicate transactions to appear in the ledger and performs saniti-
zation later (§5.3), the client need not update the ledger for each
new block. In our implementation, the Ledger Manager runs
asynchronously with respect to the Block Structure Manager,
to periodically update the ledger. Notice that this would not be
possible in Bitcoin’s current specification, since when a miner
mines a block B, it implicitly also certifies a ledger L formed
by tracing the blockchain from the genesis block to block B.
A Bitcoin client must thus verify that a block B that it receives
does not contain transactions conflicting with the ledger L,
and therefore must update the ledger synchronously for each
block. In principle, Bitcoin could do post hoc sanitization like
Prism; however, due to long block times relative to transaction
verification, doing so would not improve performance.
6.2.2 Parallel Transaction Execution
Executing a transaction involves multiple reads and writes
to the UTXO Database to (1) verify the validity of the input
coins, (2) delete the input coins, and (3) insert the output
coins. If handled sequentially, transaction execution can
quickly become the bottleneck of the whole system. Our
implementation therefore uses a pool of threads in the Ledger
Manager to execute transactions in parallel.5 However, naively
executing all transactions in parallel is problematic, because
semantically the transactions in the ledger form an order, and
must be executed strictly in this order to get to the correct final
state (i.e., UTXO set). For example, suppose transactions T
and T’ both use UTXO u as input, and T appears first in the
ledger. In this case, T’ should fail, since it tries to reuse u
when it has already been spent by T. However, if T and T’ are
executed in parallel, race condition could happen where the
inputs of T’ are checked before T deletes u from the UTXO
Database, allowing T’ to execute.
To solve this problem, we borrow the scoreboarding [33]
technique long used in processor design. A CPU employing
this method schedules multiple instructions to be executed
out-of-order, if doing so will not cause conflicts such as writing
to the same register. Transactions and CPU instructions are
alike, in the sense that they both need to be executed in the
correct order to produce correct results, only that transactions
5Despite parallelism, the UTXO database is often the bottleneck for the
entire system (§7.3).
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read and write UTXOs while CPU instructions read and write
CPU registers. In the Ledger Manager, a batch of transactions
are first passed through a controller thread before being
dispatched to one of the idle workers in the thread pool for
execution. The controller thread keeps track of the inputs and
outputs of the transactions in the batch on the scoreboard (an
in-memory hash table). Before scheduling a new transaction
for execution, it checks that none of its inputs or outputs are
present on the scoreboard. In this way, all worker threads are
able to execute in parallel without any synchronization.
6.2.3 Functional-Style Design Pattern
Our system must maintain shared state between several
modules across both databases and in-memory data structures,
creating potential for race conditions. Further, since this state
is split between the memory and the database, concurrency
primitives provided by RocksDB cannot solve the problem
completely. For example, to update the ledger, the Ledger
Manager needs to fetch the tips of the voter chains from the
memory and the votes from the Block Structure Database,
and they must be in sync. Locking both states with a global
mutex is a straightforward solution; however, such coarse
locks significantly hurt performance.
We adopt a functional-style design pattern to define the
interfaces for modules and data structures. Specifically, we
abstract each module into a function that owns no shared state.
Instead, state is passed explicitly between modules as inputs
and outputs. For example, the functionality of the Ledger Man-
ager can be abstracted as UpdateLedger(V,V ′)→∆T , where
V and V ′ are the previous and current voter chain tips, and
∆T are the transactions confirmed by votes between V and V ′.
Then, we design the database schema to support such func-
tions. For example, the Block Structure Database supports the
query VoteDiff(V,V ′)→∆Votes, where∆Votes are the added
and removed votes when the voter chains evolve from V to V ′.
In this way, function UpdateLedger can invoke VoteDiff to
update the votes and confirm new transactions with no need for
explicit synchronization, because each function guarantees the
correctness of its output with respect to its input. Functional-
style design has broaderbenefits than enabling global-lock-free
concurrency. One example is it facilitates bootstrapping (dis-
cussed in §8), where a client needs the ledger formed by leader
blocks until a certain level. Another example is reverting to a
previous version of the ledgers. Such queries are easily sup-
ported in our model by calling the above update ledger function.
6.2.4 No Transaction Broadcasting
In most traditional blockchains, clients exchange pending
transactions in their memory pools with peers. This incurs
extra network usage, because each transaction will be
broadcast twice: first as a pending transaction, and then again
as part of a block. At the throughput in which Prism operates,
such overhead becomes even more significant.
Our implementation does not broadcast pending trans-
actions, because it is unnecessary in Prism. In traditional
blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum, the whole network
mines a block every tens of seconds or even few minutes. Since
we cannot predict who will mine the next block, exchanging
pending transactions is necessary, so that they get included in
the next block regardless of who ends up mining it. In contrast,
Prism generates hundreds of transaction blocks every second.
This elevated block rate means that any individual miner is
likely to mine a transaction block in time comparable to the
delay associated with broadcasting a transaction to the rest
of the network (i.e., seconds). Hence, unlike other blockchain
protocols, there is little benefit for a Prism client to broadcast
its transactions. Non-mining clients can transmit their
transactions to one or more miners for redundancy; however,
those miners do not need to relay those transactions to peers.
7 Evaluation
Our evaluation answers the following questions:
• What is the performance of Prism in terms of transaction
throughput and confirmation latency, and how does it
compare with other protocols? (§7.1)
• How well does Prism scale to larger numbers of users?
(§7.2)
• How does Prism perform with limited resource, and how
efficient does it utilize resource? (§7.3)
• How does Prism perform when under attack? (§7.4)
Testbed: We deploy our Prism implementation on Amazon
EC2’s c5d.4xlarge instances with 16 CPU cores, 16 GB
of RAM, 400 GB of NVMe SSD, and a 10 Gbps network
interface. Each instance hosts one Prism client. By default, we
use 100 instances and connect them into a random 4-regular
graph topology. To emulate a wide-area network, we introduce
a propagation delay of 120 ms on each link to match the
typical delay between two distant cities [2], and a rate limiter
of 400 Mbps for ingress and egress traffic respectively on each
instance. We also evaluate several other network topologies
(with up 1000 instances) and per-instance bandwidth limits.
To generate workloads for those experiments, we add a
transaction generator in our Prism implementation which
continuously creates transactions at an adjustable rate.
In our testbed, the main bottleneck is RocksDB and the
I/O performance of the underlying SSD, which limits the
throughput to about 80,000 tps. We cap transaction generation
rate to 75,000 tps to avoid hitting this bottleneck.
Schemes compared: We compare Prism with Algorand and
the longest chain protocol. For Algorand, we use the official
open-source implementation [1] written in Golang. Note that
this implementation is different from the one evaluated in [18].
Therefore, we do not expect to reproduce the results in [18].
For the longest chain protocol, we modify and use our Prism
codebase to enable a fair comparison of the protocols.
Performance tuning and security: All protocols in the
experiments have design parameters, and we tried our best
to tune those parameters for performance and security. For
Prism, we calculate the optimal mining rate f for proposer and
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voter blocks to achieve the best confirmation latency, given
the adversarial ratio β and desired confirmation confidence
ε. We cap the size of transaction blocks to be 40 KB, and set
the mining rate for transaction blocks such that they support
80,000 tps. To ensure security, we calculate the expected
forking rate α, fraction of blocks not on the main chain, given
f and the block propagation delay∆. We compareα against the
forking rate actually measured in each experiment, to ensure
that the system has met the target security level. We follow
the same process for the longest chain protocol. For Algorand,
we adopt the default security parameters set in its production
implementation. Then we hand-tune its latency parameters λ
andΛ. Specifically, we reduce λ andΛ until a round times out,
and use the settings that yield the best confirmation latency.
For Prism, we target a confirmation confidence, ε, in the order
of 10−9. For the longest chain protocol, we target ε in the
order of 10−5. For Algorand, the blockchain stops growing
with a probability in the order of 10−9.
7.1 Throughput and Latency
In this experiment, we measure the transaction throughput
and confirmation latency of Prism at different adversarial
ratio β, and compare that with Algorand and the longest chain
protocol. For Algorand, we use its default setting of security
parameters, which targets β = 20%.6 For the longest chain
protocol, we experiment with two adversarial ratios: β=20%
and β=33%. In both Algorand and the longest chain protocol,
there is tradeoff between throughput and confirmation latency
by choosing different block sizes. We explore such tradeoff
and present it in a curve. For Algorand, we try block sizes
between 300 KB to 32 MB. For the longest chain protocol, we
try block sizes between 1.7 KB to 33.6 MB. The parameters
used in this experiment are available in Appendix B. All three
protocols are deployed on the same hardware and network
topology as described above. We run each experiment for a
minimum of 10 minutes and report the average transaction
throughput and latency. The results are shown in Figure 1.
7.1.1 Throughput
As shown in the results, Prism is able to maintain the same trans-
action throughput of around 75000 tps, regardless of the β cho-
sen. This is because Prism decouples throughput from security
by using transaction blocks. In this way, Prism is able to main-
tain the mining rate for transaction blocks to sustain a constant
throughput, while changing the mining rate for other types of
blocks to achieve the desiredβ. Algorand and the longest chain
protocol do not offer such decoupling, so one must increase
the block size in order to achieve a higher throughput. In such
case, the confirmation latency increases, as demonstrated by
the tradeoff curves in Figure 1, to accommodate for the higher
block propagation delay induced by larger blocks. For the
longest chain protocol, its throughput limit has been discussed
in §3.2. For Algorand, we observe its throughput increases
6The maximum possible security level for Algorand is β= 33%, but its
latency is expected to increase substantially as β approaches 33% [18].
marginally with block size, but does not exceed 1300 tps. The
reason is that Algorand only commits one block every round.
So at any moment, Algorand, unlike Prism, only has one block
propagating in the network, causing low bandwidth utilization.
7.1.2 Confirmation Latency
The confirmation latency of Prism stays below one minute for
β≤40%. At β=20%, Prism achieves a latency of 13 seconds,
which is comparable to Algorand with similar security guar-
antees. Compared to the longest chain protocol, Prism uses
multiple voter chains in parallel to provide security instead
of relying on a single chain. So Prism requires each vote to
be less deep in order to provide the same security guarantee.
As a result, Prism achieves a substantially lower confirmation
latency. For example, for β=33%, the confirmation latency
for Prism is 23 seconds, compared to 639 seconds at the lowest
throughput point for the longest chain protocol. As we increase
the block size for the longest chain protocol, its confirmation la-
tency increases to 1956 seconds at a throughput of 282 tps. The
gap between Prism and the longest chain protocol increases
for higher β. For example, for Prism the confirmation latency
increases from 13 seconds to 23 seconds as β increases from
20% to 33%. For the longest chain protocol, the same change
in β causes the latency to increase by more than 800 seconds.
7.2 Scalability
Property #Nodes 100 300 1000
Degree=4
Diameter 5 7 9
Throughput (tps) 7.2×104 7.4×104 7.4×104
Latency (s) 40 58 67
Forking 0.119 0.117 0.112
Diameter=5
Degree 4 6 8
Throughput (tps) 7.2×104 7.9×104 7.9×104
Latency (s) 40 44 37
Forking 0.119 0.119 0.127
Table 1: Performance of Prism with different network topologies.
In this experiment, we evaluate Prism’s ability to scale to a
large number of users. For each client, we use the same network
and hardware configuration as in other experiments, and target
an adversarial ratio β=40%. The results are shown in Table 1.
First, we increase the number of clients while keeping the
topology a random 4-regular graph, i.e., each client always
connects to four random peers. In this case, the network
diameter grows as the topology becomes larger, causing the
block propagation delay to increase and the confirmation
latency to increase correspondingly. Note that the transaction
throughput is not affected 7, because in Prism the mining
rate for transaction blocks is decoupled from that for other
types of blocks. Then, we explore the case where clients
connect to more peers as the topology grows larger, so that
the diameter of the network stays the same. As shown in the
results, both confirmation latency and throughput are constant
as the number of clients increases from 100 to 1000.
7In the results, the throughput increases as we increase the network
size. This is because of an artifact in our testbed which causes slightly more
transactions to be generated when there are more nodes in the network.
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Figure 7: Performance of Prism with different network bandwidth
at each client. The in-memory size of a transaction is 168 bytes.
In all cases, the forking rate stays stable and is under 0.13,
proving that the system is secure for β=40%. This suggests
that Prism is able to scale to a large number of users, as long
as the underlying peer-to-peer network provides a reasonable
block propagation delay. We also provide the distributions
of block propagation delay in each topology in Appendix C.
7.3 Resource Utilization
In this experiment, we evaluate the resource utilization of
our Prism implementation, and how it performs with limited
network bandwidth and CPU resources.
7.3.1 Network Bandwidth
Usage %Bandwidth
Received Deserialized
Proposer Block 0.05%
Voter Block 0.21%
Transaction Block 50.43%
Messaging 0.43%
Serialization Overhead 25.80%
Network Headroom 23.08%
Table 2: Network bandwidth usage breakdown of Prism measured on
a 200 Mbps interface. Network Headroom is the unused bandwidth
necessary for the block propagation delay to stay stable. Serialization
Overhead is wasted space when serializing in-memory objects for
network transmission. Messaging stands for non-block messages.
Figure 7 shows the throughput and confirmation latency of
Prism as we throttle the bandwidth at each client. Results show
that the confirmation latency is stable, and the throughput
scales proportionally to the available bandwidth. The
throughput stops to grow when the bandwidth is higher than
200 Mbps, because the transaction generation rate is capped at
75,000 tps, which is near the bottleneck caused by RocksDB.
Table 2 provides a breakdown of bandwidth usage. Our im-
plementation is able to process transaction data at a throughput
about 50% of the available bandwidth. Further improvements
could be made by using more efficient data serialization
schemes and optimizing the underlying P2P network.
7.3.2 CPU
Figure 8 shows the throughput of Prism as we change the
number of CPU cores for each client. The throughput scales
proportionally to the number of cores, and stops to grow after
7 cores because the transaction generation rate is capped. This
shows that our implementation handles more than 10,000 tps
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Figure 9: Performance of Prism under censorship attack.
per CPU core, and the parallelization techniques discussed
in §6 are effective.
Table 3 provides a breakdown of CPU usage across different
components. More than half of CPU cycles are taken by
RocksDB for which we only perform basic tuning. Less than
15% are spent on overhead operations, such as inter-thread
communication, synchronization, etc. (categorized as “Miscel-
laneous” in the table). This suggests that our implementation
uses CPU resources efficiently, and further improvements
could be made primarily by optimizing the database.
Operation %CPU
Ledger
RocksDB Read/Write 49.5%
(De)serialization 3.1%
Miscellaneous 8.9%
Blockchain
Signature Check 21.7%
(De)serialization 3.8%
RocksDB Read/Write 3.9%
Network I/O 0.6%
Miscellaneous 5.5%
Block Assembly 1.5%
Transaction Generation 0.7%
Miscellaneous 0.8%
Table 3: CPU usage breakdown of our Prism implementation.
7.4 Performance Under Active Attack
In the following experiments, we evaluate how Prism performs
in the presence of active attacks. Specifically, we consider
two orthogonal types of attacks: censorship, with a goal
of attacking the throughput, and balancing, with a goal of
attacking the confirmation latency. For each type of attack,
we configure a variable fraction of clients to be malicious
and measure the throughput and latency of the system. Note
that here we still configure Prism to tolerate a maximum
adversarial ratio β = 40%. We will demonstrate that the
performance of Prism degrades gracefully under active attacks.
Censorship Attack. In a censorship attack, malicious clients
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Figure 10: Performance of Prism under balancing attack. We also
mark the confirmation latency of the longest chain protocol with the
same security guarantee.
mine and broadcast empty transaction blocks and proposer
blocks. Censorship attack does not threaten the security of
Prism, but it reduces the system throughput because a portion
of blocks are now “useless” in a sense that they do not contain
any data. As Figure 9 shows, during a censorship attack, the
transaction throughput reduces proportionally to the percent-
age of adversarial users. Theoretically, censorship attack
could also affect the confirmation latency, because it could
take longer for a transaction block to be referred to if some
proposer blocks are empty. However, since a proposer block
is mined roughly every 10 seconds, the impact on latency is
nominal. Our results shows that the confirmation latency stays
stable as we increase the adversarial ratio from 0% to 25%.
Balancing Attack. In a balancing attack, attackers try to in-
crease the confirmation latency of the system by waiting for
the event when multiple proposer blocks appear on the same
level, and then balancing the votes among them. Normally,
when multiple proposer blocks appear on one level, every client
votes for the proposer block with the most votes, so the system
quickly converges with the vast majority of voter chains voting
for one proposer block. During a balancing attack, however, the
attacker votes on the proposer blocks with second most votes to
slow down such convergence, causing votes to be more evenly
distributed among competing proposer blocks. In this case,
clients need to wait for votes to grow deeper in order to confirm
a proposer leader, resulting in longer confirmation latency. Fig-
ure 10 shows that the confirmation latency grows as the active
adversarial fraction increases. But even when 25% clients are
malicious, the confirmation latency is still more than 10× bet-
ter than the longest chain protocol. Meanwhile, the throughput
stays stable, because such attack only targets voter blocks.
8 Discussion
We discuss some potential extensions to Prism.
(1) Light clients. SPV (Simple payment verification) are short
proofs [6] to verify the validity of a given transaction (payment)
for a light user who only downloads the blocks headers in a
blockchain. In the longest chain protocol, every transaction in
the block is valid so a Merkle proof of a transaction with respect
to its block header proves payment validity. However, this is
not enough in Prism, where transaction blocks can potentially
contain invalid transactions. We can facilitate SPV proofs in
Prism by this simple modification: We store all the unspent
coins in the ledger formed by leader blocks until level ` in a
Merkle-Patricia tree and add the root of this tree to the proposer
block(s) at level `+e (for a large value of e, say 20). Since this
tree contains only unspent coins generated by valid transac-
tions, the merkle proof of the output coins of a payment with
respect to to this commit proves the validity of the payment.
(2) Bootstrapping a new user. Longest chain blockchains
like Bitcoin use a small fraction of network bandwidth, so new
users can simply download and process all the blocks to join the
system. Since Prism runs near network capacity, expecting a
new user to download and process all the old blocks is not prac-
tical. The modification suggested in the previous paragraph
can be also used to bootstrap as follows: a new user downloads
all proposer and voter tree blocks (which consume less than
0.1% of the capacity). Say the new user’s proposer tree has
confirmed leader block at level `. We know that this leader
block stores the commit of all the unspent coins up to level `−e.
Now the new user asks an existing user for the UTXO set for
the ledger up to level `−e. The user can verify the correctness
of this set by comparing it with the UTXO set commitment
stored in the leader block at level `. This UTXO set contains all
the information required from transaction blocks referred by
proposer blocks until level `−e and thus the new user can join
the system by downloading full blocks starting from level `−e.
(3) Spamming. In Prism, miners do not validate transactions
before including them in blocks. This raises practical issues,
namely spam. An adversary could generate a large number
of conflicting transactions and disseminate them to different
nodes across the network. The nodes would then mine all of
these transactions into blocks, causing miners and validators to
waste storage and computational resources. To circumvent this,
nodes should first validate transactions with respect to their lat-
est ledger state and other unreferred transaction blocks, giving
the adversary only a small window of network delay to spam the
system. Second, miners could add some timing jitter prior to
mining transactions, giving other miners the ability to observe
if a conflicting transaction is already present in a transaction
block, in which case the miner can choose to not include that
transaction. Another possibility is for every miner to locally
monitor the reliability of transaction creators (by public key
and/or IP address); nodes that regularly submit invalid transac-
tions can eventually be locally detected, and their transactions
can be jittered for a longer time interval to further reduce spam.
(4) Smart contracts. Our current implementation achieves
high throughput and low latency on an UTXO based scripting
layer. A natural question is whether we can achieve similar
performance on a smart contract layer. Prism’s latency
depends only on the block structure at the consensus layer and
is independent of the scripting layer. Thus a smart contract
version of Prism will also achieve low confirmation latency. s
described in section 6.2.2, parallelizing transaction execution
(via scoreboarding) was vital in achieving high throughput.
The ability to parallelize trasnaction execution of smart
12
contracts will also be the key to exploit the high throughput
provided by Prism consensus.
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A Confirmation Rule
In this section we give the detailed calculation of the
confidence intervals of the votes a proposer block receives. It
is used when confirming a leader proposer block, as mentioned
in Section 5.3.
Consider the scenario where there are n proposer blocks at
level l, and let P ={BP1 ,BP2 ,...,BPn} denote the set of proposer
blocks at level l. Now we want to count the number of votes
each block will get with confidence 1−ε.
Suppose BPi gets vi votes. Here a vote stands for a voter
block which is on the longest chain of its voter tree and votes
for BPi . LetVi={BVi1 ,BVi2 ,...,BVivi} denote the set of votes that
BPi has. For every vote B
V
i j , let di j denote its depth, which is the
number of blocks appended to voter block BVi j in the longest
chain, plus one.
Now, for each vote BVi j with depth di j , we want to calculate
the probability Pi j of it being permanent. To do so, we
consider a potential private double-spend attack, assuming an
adversarial party is trying to overturn the voting results to elect
a different proposer block BPA as the leader block of level l.
Note that BPA could either be a block in P , i.e. publicly known,
or a block the adversary has privately mined but not released.
To elect BPA as the leader block of level l, the adversarial party
would need to mine its own voter chains to overturn some
existing votes to vote for BPA.
We want to compute the probability of this happening.
However, we do not know when the adversary started mining
voter blocks for BPA. Notice that the adversary has no incentive
to mine voter blocks for BPA until B
P
i has been mined and
released. Since the honest nodes are always releasing blocks,
we can use the average depth of the votes for BPi in the
public voter trees to estimate the time passed since BPi was
released, hence bounding the expected number of votes the
adversary could have accumulated on their private fork in the
same amount of time. That is, since block inter-arrivals are
exponentially distributed, the number of blocks mined since
block BPi was proposed is a Poisson random variable, with
rate equal to its mean. This quantity can be related to the time
elapsed since BPi was released via the block mining rate.
More precisely, as an honest node, we assume the fraction
of adversarial hashing power is β, and we can empirically
estimate the average depth of existing public votes as
d¯=∑i jdi j/∑ivi and the forking rate α 8 of public voter chains.
Since there are many voter chains, these estimates converge
quickly to their true means. Then, we calculate the estimated
average depth of a private voter chain, denoted as d¯A, to be
d¯A=
βd¯
(1−α)(1−β) .
Here the 1/(1−α) term accounts for forking in public voter
chains and assumes that the malicious private voter chains do
not fork. The β/(1−β) term accounts for the ratio of hashing
power between the honest users (1 − β) and the malicious
users (β). This expected depth d¯A can be used as an estimate
of the rate of the Poisson random variable of the number of
blocks in the adversary’s private chain.
Since each voter chain follows the longest-chain rule, the
calculation for Pi j is the same as in Bitcoin
Pi j =FPois(di j ;d¯A)−
di j
∑
k=0
fPois(k;d¯A)
β
1−β
di j+1−k
.
8The fraction of blocks not on the longest chain out of all blocks.
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Here FPois(x;λ) is the cumulative distribution function and
fPois(x;λ) is the probability mass function of Poisson distribu-
tion with rate parameter λ. In this expression, the first term is
the probability that the adversary has mined fewer than di j+1
blocks, in which case it cannot currently overtake the main
chain. The second term computes, for each possible length
of the adversary’s chain, the probability that the adversary
overtakes the public voter chain in the future by mining faster.
Given Pi j , we can now calculate the confidence interval of
votes on each proposer block. For proposer block BPi and each
of its votes BVi j , let V˜i j be the random variable where
V˜i j =
{
1, if vote BVi j is secure forever (permanent)
0, if vote BVi j will be overturned
.
With some abuse of notation, let vi be the random variable
equal to the number of secure votes of BPi . We have
vi=∑
j
BVi j .
Note that V˜i j ∼ Bernoulli(Pi j). Then the lower confidence
bound of votes on BPi (denoted as bvic) can be obtained by
calculating in ε-quantile of random variable vi.
In real-world implementations, given the complexity of
such computation, its closed-form approximation may be
used. We can approximate vi using a Gaussian distribution
N (µi,σ2i )where
µi=∑
j
Pi j .
σ2i =∑
j
Pi j(1−Pi j).
Using the closed-form approximation of the quantile function
of normal distribution, we have
bvic≈µi−σi
√
ln
1
ε2
−lnln 1
ε2
−ln(2pi).
Now, we consider the upper confidence bound of votes
on BPi (denoted as dvie). Here, we want to defend against the
worst case where for each BPi , only bvic votes are retained, and
the adversarial party controls the remaining votes (we let dvAe
denote the number of such votes). Recall that each voter chain
can only vote for each proposer level once. For a system with
m voter chains, we have
dvAe=m−∑
i
bvic.
The adversarial party will use those votes to vote for BPA. Since
BPA could be any block in P , we have
dvie=bvic+dvAe.
BPA could also be a block which the adversarial party mines
but has not released. In such case, the upper bound of votes
on BPA is just dvAe. Finally, to select the leader of level l, we
search for the block BPL ∈ P satisfying bvLc> dvie for every
i 6= L and bvLc> dvAe. In words, we select the block whose
lower bound of votes is higher than the upper bound of any
other known or unknown proposer block in the same level.
Parameter Value
Transaction Block Size 228 transactions
Voter Block Size 1000 votes
Proposer Block Size 7000 references
Voter Chains (m) 1000
Transaction Mining Rate 350 Blocks/s
Voter Mining Rate Table 5
Proposer Mining Rate Table 5
Table 4: Parameters of Prism.
β Mining Rate ( f )
0.20 0.535
0.33 0.185
0.40 0.097
0.42 0.081
0.43 0.069
0.44 0.054
Table 5: Mining rate f of proposer and voter blocks for different
β in Prism. The unit is Blocks/s.
Block Size Assembly Time (s) λ (s) Λ (s)
1287 0.5 0.6 1.6
4366 0.8 1.2 3.0
8733 1.6 1.9 6.5
13100 1.6 1.9 10.0
17294 1.6 2.0 13.0
21504 1.9 2.3 16.0
42334 3.5 3.9 38.0
64614 5.0 5.4 56.0
85513 7.0 7.4 73.0
85836 7.0 7.4 68.0
103004 8.4 8.8 84.0
116580 9.5 9.9 99.0
133766 11.0 11.4 110.0
Table 6: Parameters of Algorand. Block Size: number of transactions
in a block. Assembly Time: maximum time spent on assembling a
block (this limit was never hit in the experiment). λ: expected time to
reach consensus on block hash. Λ: expected time to reach consensus
on the actual block. Detailed definition in [18].
B Parameters Used in Evaluations
Here we present the parameters used in the experiment in
§7.1 for Prism (Table 4, Table 5), Algorand (Table 6), and the
longest chain protocol (Table 7).
C Block Propagation Delay Distribution
Here we present the distribution plots of the block propagation
delay (∆) in topologies tested in our scalability experiment
(§7.2). The data are shown in Figures 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. In
each plot, the concrete lines mark the mean of the propagation
delay of that type of blocks, and the dashed lines mark the 25%
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β Block Size Mining Rate ( f )
0.20
10 0.404
260 0.262
1000 0.221
4000 0.144
10000 0.110
20000 0.079
60000 0.064
200000 0.027
0.33
10 0.168
260 0.117
1000 0.119
4000 0.065
Table 7: Mining rate f for different β and block sizes in the longest
chain protocol. Here block sizes are in terms of transactions.
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Figure 11: Block propagation delay. Nodes= 100, Degree= 4,
Diameter=5
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Figure 12: Block propagation delay. Nodes= 300, Degree= 4,
Diameter=7
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Figure 13: Block propagation delay. Nodes= 300, Degree= 6,
Diameter=5
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Figure 14: Block propagation delay. Nodes= 1000, Degree= 4,
Diameter=9
and 75% quantiles. Comparing Figures 11, 13, 15 we observe
that as long as the network diameter is kept constant, the block
propagation delay is barely affected by the increase of clients.
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Figure 15: Block propagation delay. Nodes= 1000, Degree= 8,
Diameter=5
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